L. Stafford Betty and Bruce Cordell argue that for the Universe to have evolved to its present state as the result of randomly-determined initial conditions is so improbable, that it is relatively likely that these conditions were determined by an intelligent designer. To the contrary, I argue that since the Big Bang was atemporal, our criteria of theoretical adequacy are necessarily orthogonal to the nature of the event. As a result, we cannot reason that intelligent design is more or less likely than any other theory of how these initial conditions were determined. Betty and Cordell can avoid this objection by claiming that although intelligent design is no more probable than random evolution, it is more reasonable by dearth of evidence to posit an intelligent designer.

Betty and Cordell give what they consider to be the most scientific statement of the anthropic principle as their argument’s first premise: (A) “the possibility of life as we know it evolving in the Universe depends on the values of a few basic physical constants—and is…remarkably sensitive to their numerical values,” (239). (B) The chance that one, let alone all of these constants were assigned by a random process is unfathomably small, with odds somewhere in the neighborhood of one in 1×10e133 (239). (C) The alternative of an intelligent designer having assigned these values is “easier to imagine‚” (236) and “seems somewhat more probable‚” (239), so (D) when confronted with a choice between a random assignment of these constants and an intelligent designer behind the scenes, (E) “the designer may be considered highly probable” (239).

My objection confronts the “intuitive” appeals of the cosmology presented. The modern conception of space-time reveals that the Big Bang was an atemporal event. There is no change without time (~time –> ~change), there is no causality without change, (~change –> ~causality) and there is no human reasoning without causality (~causality –> ~reason). From these prerequisites of change, causality, and reason, and by two transitive inferences, we see that there is no human reason without time (~time –> ~reason). Therefore, as you can only approach the Big Bang as a limit in time, you can only reason about the Big Bang to a limit, or to what I call an asymptotic point of inconceivability (POI). At this point beyond (apropos before) our reason, the intuitional criteria by which we estimate the relative adequacy of the theories in contention are necessarily orthogonal to the nature of the event. The authors’ premise C, that a creative intelligence fixing the constants at this point is easier to imagine and seemingly more probable, has no explanatory weight because the event is infinitely unintuitive. Because of this, it cannot follow from the original argument that a designer having determined the initial conditions of our Universe may be considered relatively probable.

The authors can respond to this objection by conceding that while intelligent design may be no more probable than random evolution, it is more reasonable to posit an intelligent designer if confronted with a forced choice between the two theories. Why? Given the cognitive inaccessibility of the POI, and all theories being equally likely by any and all of our methods of discovery, we are justified by dearth of evidence to defer to our gut on the matter. This is to grant the objection, but nevertheless to say that our intuition is all we have so we should use it. As products and elements of the Universe, our minds take part in its nature, so even if we cannot reason all the way to the beginning, we can still go as far back as possible. In a situation where we are forced to decide on a theory for the origin of our Universe, we are justified in positing a creative intelligence.